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Abstract	
Indigenous	 peoples	 in	 Australia,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Canada	 are	 significantly	
overrepresented	as	defendants	in	criminal	trials	and	yet	vastly	underrepresented	on	juries	
in	criminal	trials.	This	means	that	all‐white	juries	mostly	determine	the	guilt	of	Indigenous	
defendants	or	white	defendants	responsible	for	harming	Indigenous	victims.	In	this	article,	
we	explore	cases	 in	which	Indigenous	defendants	have	perceived	that	an	all‐white	jury’s	
prejudice	against	Indigenous	people	would	prevent	them	receiving	a	fair	trial.	It	focuses	on	
Indigenous	defendants	(often	facing	charges	in	relation	to	protesting	against	white	racism)	
challenging	the	array	of	all‐white	juries.	Across	these	cases,	Australian	courts	rely	on	formal	
notions	of	fairness	in	jury	selection	to	dismiss	the	Indigenous	defendant’s	perception	of	bias	
and	 foreclose	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 potential	 prejudices	 of	white	 jurors.	We	 compare	 the	
Australian	judicial	‘colour‐blindness’	towards	all‐white	juries	with	that	of	the	United	States	
and	 Canada.	We	 argue	 that	 the	 tendency	 for	 courts	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Canada	 to	
question	jurors	on	their	biases	provides	useful	lessons	for	Australian	judiciaries,	including	
in	 relation	 to	 the	 impending	 trials	 of	 Indigenous	 defendants	 in	 Kalgoorlie,	 Western	
Australia,	accused	of	committing	crimes	in	response	to	white	racist	violence.	Nonetheless,	
across	all	jurisdictions	where	there	is	a	challenge	to	the	array	based	on	racial	composition,	
courts	consistently	uphold	all‐white	juries.	We	suggest	that	the	judicial	view	of	the	racial	
neutrality	of	white	 jury	selection	misapprehends	 the	substantive	biases	 in	 jury	selection	
and	the	injustice	perceived	by	defendants	in	having	a	white	jury	adjudicate	an	alleged	crime	
that	is	committed	in	circumstances	involving	protest	against	white	prejudice.		
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Introduction		
Indigenous	 people	 are	 significantly	 overrepresented	 as	 defendants	 in	 criminal	 trials	 and	 in	
prisons	and	yet	vastly	underrepresented	on	juries	in	criminal	trials	in	Australia,	the	United	States	
and	Canada.	In	Australia,	for	instance,	thirty	one	per	cent	of	all	cases	that	proceed	to	trial	involve	
Indigenous	defendants,	amounting	to	about	40,000	Indigenous	defendants	across	the	three	states	
of	New	South	Wales,	Queensland,	South	Australia	(but	excluding	Victoria,	Western	Australia	and	
Tasmania	 )and	 including	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 (but	 not	 the	 Australian	 Capital	 Territory)	
(Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	2015:	Table	9).	Of	these,	approximately	1200	cases	will	involve	
Indigenous	defendants	tried	for	indictable	offences	in	higher	courts.	Juries	will	preside	over	most	
indictable	offences	to	enable	the	offender’s	peers	to	hear	the	evidence	and	decide	if	she	or	he	is	
guilty	or	not	guilty	of	a	serious	crime	based	on	the	facts	(see,	for	example,	Criminal	Procedure	Act	
1986	(NSW)	s	131).		
	
However,	an	Indigenous	accused	who	proceeds	to	trial	will	rarely	encounter	Indigenous	jurors	
on	the	jury,	given	that	Indigenous	people	constitute	less	than	0.5	per	cent	of	jurors	(New	South	
Wales	Law	Reform	Commission	2009:	12).	The	incidence	of	over‐representation	of	Indigenous	
people	as	defendants	in	criminal	trials	and	under‐representation	as	jurors	is	equally	startling	in	
Canada	and	resulted	in	a	national	inquiry	into	the	problem	(Iacobucci	2013).	In	some	Australian	
jurisdictions,	such	as	the	Northern	Territory,	there	is	a	particularly	vast	disparity	between	the	
proportion	of	the	population	that	are	Indigenous	(30	per	cent)	and	the	proportion	of	Indigenous	
jurors,	given	that	these	jurors,	even	when	eligible,	rarely	make	it	on	to	jury	(Goldflam	2011a:	37).	
This	could	be	explained	in	part	by	the	high	rate	of	disqualifications	(25	per	cent)	in	the	Northern	
Territory	 due	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 criminal	 records	 (Goldflam	2011a:	 35).	 The	Australian	 Law	
Reform	Commission	(1986:	[590])	described	the	fact	that	Indigenous	people	‘so	seldom	appear	
on	juries’	as	a	‘matter	for	concern’.	The	Law	Reform	Commission	of	Western	Australia	(Hands	and	
Williams	2010:	34)	highlighted	the	injustice	of	Indigenous	juror	under‐representation.		
	
There	are	 structural	 impediments	 that	preclude	 Indigenous	people	 from	being	 called	 for	 jury	
service	and	empaneled	on	 juries,	which	 lead	 to	 the	underrepresentation	of	 Indigenous	 jurors.	
Indigenous	 people,	 among	 others,	 can	 be	 excluded	 from	 jury	 selection	 during	 the	 following	
stages:	compiling	jury	lists	(by	only	including	people	registered	on	electoral	rolls	and	living	in	
jury	districts	near	major	cities	or	towns);	peremptory	challenges	(when	a	set	number	of	persons,	
without	reason,	may	be	set	aside);	challenges	for	cause	(when	persons	are	removed	for	a	reason);	
and	 prosecutorial	 vetting	 (for	 example,	 identifying	 whether	 the	 prospective	 juror	 has	 a	
disqualifying	criminal	record)	(Chesterman	1999:	78;	Horan	and	Goodman‐Delahunty	2010:	173;	
Israel	2000:	100;	Queensland	Law	Reform	Commission	2011:	357).		
	
Each	Australian	jurisdiction	has	its	own	common	law	rules	and	legislation	for	compiling	jury	lists,	
with	the	mutual	effect	of	Indigenous	under‐representation	on	juries.	The	general	approach	is	for	
jurors	to	be	drawn	from	the	pool	of	adults	registered	on	the	electoral	roll	and	resident	in	jury	
districts	(see	Juries	Act	(NT);	Jury	Act	1899	(Tas);	Juries	Act	1927	(SA);	Juries	Act	1957	(WA);	Juries	
Act	1967	(ACT);	Jury	Act	1977	(NSW);	Jury	Act	1995	(Qld);	Juries	Act	2000	(Vic)).	The	reasons	for	
under‐representation	are,	 first,	 federally	maintained	electoral	 rolls	exclude	a	 large	number	of	
Indigenous	people	who	may	be	otherwise	listed	on	Centrelink	or	health	records,	which	are	also	
the	responsibility	of	the	federal	government	(Northern	Territory	Law	Reform	Committee	2013:	
19‐20).	Second,	jury	districts	are	located	in	areas	in	which	higher	courts	sit,	which	are	proximate	
to	 cities	 and	 towns	 rather	 than	 remote	 communities.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	Northern	Territory,	
juries	sit	in	Darwin	and	Alice	Springs,	and	very	occasionally	in	Katherine.	This	has	the	effect	of	
excluding	up	to	50	per	cent	of	Northern	Territory’s	Indigenous	population	which	lives	in	regional	
and	remote	areas	(Northern	Territory	Law	Reform	Committee	2013:	21).	
	
Within	 the	enlisted	pool,	persons	may	be	disqualified	 for	having	a	 criminal	 record,	 an	 illness,	
being	mentally	unfit,	or	having	caring	responsibilities	(for	example,	Juries	Act	(NT)	s	10,	Jury	Act	
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1977	(NSW)	Schedules	1	&	2).	In	relation	to	criminal	records,	this	will	be	a	more	significant	basis	
for	exclusion	from	jury	service	for	Indigenous	people	than	non‐Indigenous	people	given	that	they	
are	 disproportionately	 criminalised.	 In	 R	 v	Woods	 &	Williams	 ([2010]	 NTSC	 69:	 24),	 a	 case	
involving	two	Indigenous	defendants	accused	of	murder,	evidence	was	adduced	that,	of	the	350	
people	 selected	 for	 jury	 service,	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 them	were	 disqualified	 due	 to	 their	 criminal	
records.		
	
The	eligibility	of	Indigenous	people	for	jury	service	may	also	be	affected	by	Indigenous	peoples’	
relative	lack	of	access	to	reliable	and	expedient	postal	services;	greater	caring	responsibilities;	
difficulties	 in	 speaking	 or	 reading	 in	 Standard	 English	 in	 some	 areas	 (La	 Canna	 2014);	 or	
disproportionate	 chronic	 health	 problems,	 including	 hearing	 loss	 (which	 the	 High	 Court	 of	
Australia	has	ruled	can	lawfully	result	in	disqualification	in	Lyons	v	State	of	Queensland	[2016]	
HCA	38).	Indigenous	people	also	seek	to	be	excused	at	greater	rates	due	to	a	conflict	of	interest	
with	an	Indigenous	defendant,	the	‘negative	consequences’	for	the	juror	in	her/his	community	
following	 jury	 duty	 (Goodman‐Delahunty	 et	 al.	 2008:	 164),	 or	 negative	 experiences	with	 the	
criminal	 justice	 system	 (Frankland	 2004:	 57).	 These	 factors	 ought	 to	 persuade	 legislators	 to	
carefully	consider	disqualification	criteria	for	jury	selection	and	structural	and	cultural	barriers	
to	Indigenous	participation	on	juries.		
	
If	the	jury	signifies	the	‘democratic	integrity’	and	‘conscience’	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	as	its	
foundational	principles	purport	(see	Hunter	2005:	318;	Israel	1998:	37),	then	the	question	has	to	
be	asked	‘whose	conscience	is	being	invoked’?	Given	that	Indigenous	defendants	cannot	expect	a	
jury	of	Indigenous	peers,	can	we	expect	Indigenous	Australians	to	have	confidence	that	they	will	
receive	 a	 fair	 trial?	 The	 following	 sections	 demonstrate	 the	 perception	 among	 Indigenous	
defendants	that	they	will	not	receive	a	fair	trial	where	the	panel	of	peers	comprises	white	persons,	
particularly	where	the	alleged	crime	pertains	to	a	response	to	white	racism.	Their	challenges	to	
the	array	of	all‐white	 juries	pivot	on	the	 idea	that	 there	will	be	prejudice	among	these	 jurors,	
particularly	where	racial	divides	and	tensions	are	relevant	to	the	charges	they	face.	The	response	
by	courts	in	key	Australia	cases	has	been	to	reject	such	challenges	based	on	the	notion	that	jury	
selection	is	racially	blind	and	procedurally	fair,	irrespective	of	the	constitutive	character	of	the	
jury.	 They	 hold	 that	 to	 challenge	 an	 all‐white	 jury	 constitutes	 a	 race‐based	 intervention	 that	
interferes	with	good	governance.		
	
We	 argue	 that	 these	 decisions	 reveal	 a	 judicial	 acceptance	 of	 the	 ‘normalcy	 of	 whiteness’	
(Williams	1997:	7).	In	doing	so,	we	draw	on	Critical	Whiteness	or	Race	Theory	(CRT),	which	has	
its	genesis	in	the	United	States	(for	example,	Bell	1992,	1995;	Delgado	1989;	Harris	1993)	and	
has	 been	 adapted	 by	 Australian	 scholars	 to	 analyse	 Indigenous	 postcolonial	 experiences	
(Behrendt	 2001;	Moreton‐Robinson	 2004,	 2007;	Watson	 2005).	CRT	points	 to	 the	 continuing	
spectre	of	institutional	racism	that	accepts	white	perspectives	as	racially	normative	(see	Harris	
1993:	1714;	Moreton‐Robinson	2003:	23).	CRT	scholar	Cheryl	Harris	(1993:	1768)	states	that	
maintaining	the	norm	of	‘whiteness’	and	‘colorblindness’	denies	the	‘historical	context	of	white	
domination	and	Black	subordination’.	This	was	also	recognised	by	the	Royal	Commission	 into	
Aboriginal	Deaths	in	Custody	(1991:	[10.3.1])	when	it	noted	that	Europeans	‘define	the	world	in	
their	terms’	while	failing	to	see	their	own	subjectivity.	The	same	assumptions	lie	at	the	heart	of	
the	judicial	belief	that	the	‘lay	juror’,	who	is	typically	white,	has	an	objective	worldview	and	is	
racially	neutral.	
	
The	 opening	 section	 of	 this	 article	 explores	 judicial	 rationales	 for	 maintaining	 the	 existing	
institution	of	the	jury	in	Australia,	which	is	predicated	on	a	defendant	being	tried	by	a	panel	of	
peers.	We	point	to	cases	in	which	Indigenous	defendants	perceive	the	under‐representation	of	
Indigenous	jurors	as	impairing	a	fair	trial.	They	regard	white	jurors	as	prone	to	racism	against	
Indigenous	people	and	as	lacking	the	capacity	to	understand	the	Indigenous	person’s	standpoint.		
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The	 second	 section	 outlines	 the	 judicial	 reasoning	 in	 dismissing	 Indigenous	 challenges	 to	 all‐
white	 juries	 in	 leading	 Australian	 cases,	 based	 on	 formal	 equality	 in	 jury	 selection	 and	
empanelment.	We	argue	that	this	approach	overlooks	the	structural	barriers	that	preclude	the	
empanelment	of	Indigenous	jurors	(notably	the	higher	proportion	of	Indigenous	people	who	have	
a	criminal	record	and	the	under‐representation	of	Indigenous	people	on	electoral	rolls)	(Goldflam	
2011a:	37;	Horan	2008:	32).	It	is	also	ignores	the	Indigenous	person’s	perception	that	a	white	
jury	will	not	deliver	justice,	especially	where	a	political	and	media	campaign	has	been	adverse	to	
the	Indigenous	defendant.		
	
In	the	third	section,	we	compare	Australian	court	decisions	on	challenges	to	the	array	of	all‐white	
juries	with	those	of	the	Canadian	and	United	States	Supreme	Courts.	While	these	overseas	courts	
have	handed	down	similar	reasoning	in	challenges	to	the	array,	this	section	identifies	their	more	
proactive	 efforts	 to	 address	 racial	 prejudice	 among	 jurors	 through	 challenges	 for	 cause	 and	
peremptory	challenges.		
	
The	concluding	section	raises	some	red	flags	for	the	trials	of	protesters	who	were	responding	to	
the	 racism	underpinning	 the	 killing	 of	 14‐year‐old	 Indigenous	 boy	Elijah	Doughty	 in	 2016	 in	
Kalgoorlie.2	It	points	to	the	utility	of	adopting	the	United	States	procedure	of	interrogating	jurors	
on	their	potential	racism,	which	has	taken	root	since	the	Ferguson	uprising	in	response	to	police	
shooting	 of	 African	 American	 teenager	 Michael	 Brown.	 It	 concludes	 that	 judiciaries	 need	 to	
eschew	their	colour‐blind	approach	to	all‐white	juries	and	address	the	Indigenous	defendant’s	
perception	of	a	miscarriage	of	justice	in	challenges	to	the	array.	
	
Legally	neutral	white	juries	and	Indigenous	perceptions	of	prejudice	
The	premise	of	the	Australian	jury	system	is	that	defendants	accused	of	serious	crimes	have	the	
right	to	be	tried	by	their	peers	to	ascertain	the	‘truth	in	questions	of	fact’	(Huddart,	Parker	&	Co	
Pty	Ltd	v	Moorehead	(1909)	8	CLR	330:	375).	The	jury	is	intended	to	project	the	norms	of	society.	
So	vital	is	the	role	of	the	jury	to	the	Australian	legal	system	that	it	is	one	of	the	few	explicit	rights	
contained	in	the	Australian	Constitution	under	s	80,	and	has	been	referred	to	by	Griffith	CJ	of	the	
High	Court	of	Australia	as	‘a	fundamental	law	of	the	Commonwealth’	(R	v	Snow	1915	20	CLR	315:	
316).	The	High	Court	in	Kingswell	v	The	Queen	(1985	159	CLR	264:	[5])	endorsed	the	statement	
of	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	in	Duncan	v	Louisiana	(1968	391	US	145:	156)	that	the	jury	
reflects:	
	
a	 fundamental	 decision	 about	 the	 exercise	 of	 official	 power—a	 reluctance	 to	
entrust	plenary	powers	over	the	life	and	liberty	of	the	citizen	to	one	judge	or	to	a	
group	 of	 judges.	 Fear	 of	 unchecked	 power,	 so	 typical	 of	 our	 State	 and	 Federal	
Governments	 in	 other	 respects,	 found	 expression	 in	 the	 criminal	 law	 in	 this	
insistence	 upon	 community	 participation	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 guilt	 or	
innocence.	(Kingswell	v	The	Queen	(1985	159	CLR	264:	[5];	see	also	Magna	Carta	
1215	(Runnymede,	England):	Ch.	39)	
	
An	essential	feature	of	trial	by	jury	is	that	juries	be	comprised	of	a	‘representative’	section	of	the	
community,	according	to	the	High	Court	ruling	in	Cheatle	v	The	Queen	(1993	177	CLR	541:	[4]).	
Although	originally	 this	 included	only	propertied	men,	by	1900,	when	 juries	were	established	
across	Australia,	juror	qualifications	were	relaxed	to	include	females	and	those	without	property	
(Castles	1982;	Evatt	1936).	However,	it	was	not	until	the	1960s	that	Indigenous	people	(through	
changes	to	state	and	territory	voting	laws)	were	listed	on	the	electoral	roll	and	were	eligible	to	
serve	on	juries.	This	very	short	history	of	Indigenous	peoples’	eligibility	for	jury	duty	is	thus	set	
against	a	much	longer	history	of	Indigenous	exclusion.		
	
The	Cheatle	principle	of	representative	jury	has	never	ensured	that	the	accused	be	tried	by	a	jury	
reflecting	the	gender,	class	or	cultural	representation	of	the	local	community.	Rather,	an	accused	
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person	is	‘entitled	to	be	tried	by	an	independent	and	impartial	jury	selected	in	accordance	with	
the	law’	(R	v	Walker	(1989)	2	Qd	R	79;	R	v	Woods	&	Williams	[2010]	NTSC	69:	24).	The	principle	
does,	nonetheless,	establish	the	expectation	that,	on	the	whole,	juries	will	include	representation	
of	racial	minorities	(Parliament	of	Victoria	Law	Reform	Committee	1997:	[1.20];	Queensland	Law	
Reform	Commission	2011:	68).	Contrary	to	such	an	expectation,	it	has	been	argued	that	juries	in	
Australia	 are,	 at	 best,	 ‘moderately	 representative’	 (Freiberg	 1988:	 113)	 and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Indigenous	 Australians,	 not	 representative	 at	 all	 (Goldflam	 2011a:	 37;	 Hands,	 Williams	 and	
Davies	2006:	188).		
	
The	‘peers’	that	Indigenous	Australians	often	face	in	a	jury	rarely	come	from	the	community	in	
which	they	belong.	For	the	institution	of	the	jury	to	function	as	a	moral	conscience	and	for	it	to	
gain	the	confidence	of	Indigenous	people,	it	is	imperative	that	Indigenous	people	believe	that	the	
jury	 is	 capable	 of	 understanding	 their	moral	 and	 ethical	worldview	 and	 the	 circumstances	 in	
which	they	live.	Otherwise,	 the	jury	lacks	legitimacy	for	Indigenous	defendants	where	a	white	
jury	is	determining	guilt	or	for	Indigenous	victims	where	the	accused	is	white.	Purdy	and	McGlade	
(2001:	105)	observed	that	a	series	of	decisions	by	all‐white	juries	acquitting	white	defendants	
who	had	killed	Indigenous	victims	was	evidence	of	prejudice	(also	see	Eggleston	1976:	144‐148).	
Commenting	on	the	British	imposition	of	the	jury	system	on	its	colonies,	Vogler	(2001:	525)	states	
that	‘to	the	colonised’	the	jury	‘often	represented	little	more	than	arbitrary	authority	and	racism’.	
This	perception	of	white	juries	determining	the	guilt	of	coloured	peoples	led	to	the	demise	of	the	
jury	institution	in	India	and	most	of	Africa	(Vogler	2001:	549).	
	
Indigenous	 Australians	 before	 the	 courts	 (as	 defendants	 or	 victims),	 and	 their	 families,	 and	
communities,	have	expressed	that	all‐white	juries	routinely	try	their	people	and	do	so	with	bias.	
This	view	emerged	in	the	criminal	trial	of	Senior	Sergeant	Christopher	Hurley.	This	police	officer	
was	charged	with	manslaughter	and	assault	following	the	death	of	36‐year‐old	Indigenous	man	
Mulrunji	Doomadgee	in	a	police	cell	on	19	November	2004.	A	coroner	and	independent	inquiry	
found	that	arresting	officer	Hurley	caused	Mulrunji’s	death	when,	45	minutes	after	his	arrest,	
Mulrunji	 died	with	 a	 cleaved	 liver,	 broken	 ribs,	 a	 ruptured	 portal	 vein	 and	 a	 haemorrhaging	
pancreas	(Tedmanson	2008:	154).	The	Palm	Island	Indigenous	community	had	little	confidence	
that	justice	would	be	delivered	when	an	all‐white	jury	was	empaneled	to	decide	the	case.	This	
was	 confirmed	 when	 it	 took	 less	 than	 four	 hours	 to	 determine	 that	 Hurley	 was	 not	 guilty	
(Marriner	2009).	Lex	Wotton,	a	Palm	Islander	activist	for	justice	for	Mulrunji,	criticised	the	all‐
white	jury	process.	He	stated	in	a	public	address	following	Hurley’s	acquittal,	‘Justice	has	a	colour	
and	it	is	white’	(quoted	in	Marriner	2007).		
	
Six	days	later,	Lex	Wotton	was	sentenced	for	‘inciting	a	riot’	due	to	his	involvement	in	protests	to	
the	racist	violence	against	Mulrunji	and	the	prejudicial	police	investigation.	He	told	a	meeting	on	
Palm	Island	some	years	later	that	he	was	‘already	deemed	guilty’	before	his	trial	by	an	‘all‐white’	
jury	(Elks	2011:	3).	This	was	also	the	fate	of	many	other	Palm	Islanders	protesting	against	the	
injustice	of	Mulrunji’s	death	(Anthony	2008:	469;	Graham	2008a:	1).	An	author	of	this	paper,	who	
had	carriage	of	Wotton’s	defence,	recalls	that,	at	the	moment	that	the	jury	verdict	was	delivered	
in	open	Court,	supporters	of	Mr	Wotton	in	the	public	gallery	protested	with	words	to	the	effect	of	
‘what	do	you	expect,	white	 judge,	white	 jury,	white	 lawyers’.	Chris	Graham	(2008b),	a	 former	
editor	of	a	number	of	Indigenous	newspapers,	encapsulated	the	different	outcomes	flowing	from	
a	white	jury	depending	on	the	colour	of	the	accused:	
	
Now	here’s	the	wash‐up.	
Chris	Hurley—a	white	cop—was	tried	by	an	all‐white	 jury,	overseen	by	a	white	
judge	on	a	charge	of	manslaughter.	He	got	off.	
Lex	Wotton—a	black	man—was	also	tried	by	an	all‐white	jury,	overseen	by	a	white	
judge	on	a	charge	of	rioting	with	destruction.	He’s	facing	life.	
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Richard	Frankland	(2004:	57),	a	prominent	member	of	the	Gournditchmara	nation	in	Victoria,	
articulates	that	the	jury	and	court	institutions	are	detached	from	Indigenous	peoples’	lives.	He	
wrote	that	neither	himself	nor	any	of	his	family	had	ever	been	called	for	jury	service	(Frankland	
2004:	50).	These	experiences	contribute	to	 Indigenous	peoples’	perceptions	that	they	will	not	
receive	a	fair	trial	where	there	is	an	all‐white	jury.	Such	views	ground	legal	challenges	to	the	array	
of	an	all‐white	jury,	which	is	outlined	in	the	following	section.		
	
Judicial	colour‐blindness	in	Indigenous	challenges	to	white	juries	
The	 first	 reported	 case	 of	 an	 Indigenous	 defendant	 challenging	 the	 jury	 array	 involved	 overt	
racism	by	the	prosecution	in	vetting	Indigenous	jurors	and	set	a	high	bar	for	the	type	of	explicitly	
racist	act	required	to	found	a	successful	challenge.	R	v	Smith	(1981	3	ALB	81)	is	authority	for	the	
fact	 that	 a	 court	has	 the	discretion	 to	 discharge	 the	 entire	 jury	where	 it	may	 give	 rise	 to	 the	
perception	 of	 prejudice.3	 The	 widely	 cited	 Bourke	 District	 Court	 case	 in	 1981	 involved	 the	
prosecution	lodging	three	peremptory	challenges	to	Indigenous	jurors,	resulting	in	an	all‐white	
jury.4	 The	 Court	 allowed	 Smith’s	 application	 to	 discharge	 the	 all‐white	 jury	 (Rees	 1981:	 11).	
Martin	J	accepted	that	the	prosecution	had	the	‘absolute	right’	to	challenge	Indigenous	people	on	
the	jury	without	providing	a	reason,	but	told	the	court	that	‘justice	must	not	only	be	done,	it	must	
appear	quite	clearly	to	be	done’	(emphasis	added,	quoted	 in	Rees	1981:	11).	The	 judge	raised	
concerns	 that	 allowing	 the	 current	 jury	 to	 hear	 the	 trial	would	mean	 ‘some	members	 of	 our	
community,	of	our	country,	may	think	that	appearances	suggest	that	 justice	is	not	being	done’	
(Rees	1981:	11).		
	
The	court	in	R	v	Smith	validated	the	perception	of	bias	because	the	prosecution	was	assertive	in	
excluding	 jurors	based	on	 their	Aboriginality.	However,	 courts	are	unwilling	 to	 accommodate	
Indigenous	defendants	who	perceive	bias	where	an	all‐white	jury	has	been	empaneled	based	on	
random	selection,	because	courts	regard	this	as	a	fair	process	without	discriminatory	intent	(see	
critique	by	Flagg	1993:	954).	Critical	Race	Theorists	have	observed	that	challenges	to	racism	are	
more	effective	when	the	focus	is	on	racist	individuals	or	events	rather	than	on	systemic	racism	
that	is	hidden	in	institutions	and	their	practices.	Morrison	(1992:	17)	provides	the	metaphor	of	
seeing	the	white	fish	(blatant	racism)	without	seeing	the	whiteness	of	the	fishbowl	(dominant	
racial	discourses	and	understandings).	Courts	are	impervious	to	the	fishbowl	as	long	as	the	fish	
(legal	actors	and	legislative	provisions)	appear	neutral.		
	
The	New	South	Wales	Supreme	Court	and	Court	of	Appeal	in	Binge	v	Bennett	(1988	13	NSWLR	
578)	relied	on	the	position	that	fairness	in	jury	selection	was	assured	by	the	legislated	procedure.	
The	 courts	 dismissed	 the	 defendants’	 perception	 that	 the	 likely	 outcome	 of	 an	 all‐white	 jury	
would	give	rise	to	racial	prejudice	 in	their	highly	politicised	trial.	Binge	v	Bennett	 involved	16	
Gomeroi	people,	from	Toomelah	and	Boggabilla	(northern	New	South	Wales),	who	were	charged	
with	riot	offences	(as	a	result	of	protesting	against	racist	violence	and	discriminatory	treatment	
in	social	services).	The	defendants	sought	to	avoid	an	all‐white	jury	by	applying	to	the	court	for	
their	case	to	be	relocated	from	the	site	of	the	racial	conflict,	Goondiwindi,	Queensland	(directly	
adjacent	to	the	border	town	of	Boggabilla),	to	New	South	Wales	(where	a	mixed	jury	was	more	
likely).	 This	 followed	 the	 defendants’	 unsuccessful	 application	 to	 the	 court	 that	 it	 had	 no	
jurisdiction	 over	 Gomeroi	 people	 because	 they	 had	 not	 ceded	 sovereignty	 (Anon.	 1987a:	 9,	
1987b:	3).	The	backdrop	to	their	charges	were	protests	in	Goondiwindi	in	January	1987	involving	
hundreds	of	local	and	nearby	Toomelah	and	Boggabilla	Indigenous	residents.	The	protests	were	
a	response	to	violent	attacks	by	white	people	on	Indigenous	victims	that	had	been	ignored	by	the	
police,	as	well	as	to	the	exclusion	of	Indigenous	residents	from	housing,	clean	water,	health	care,	
education	and	employment	(Anon.	1987c:	2,	1987d:	1,	10;	Maher	1987:	2).	The	protests	led	to	an	
inquiry	 by	 the	Human	 Rights	 and	 Equal	 Opportunity	 Commission	 (HREOC)	 (1988,	 see	 Anon.	
1987d:	 2)	 that	 found	 racism	 in	 schools,	 service	 delivery	 and	 among	 white	 residents	 who	
threatened	Indigenous	residents’	safety	(HREOC	2008:	3‐4,	53‐54).	
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To	 support	 their	 application	 for	 relocation	of	 the	 trial	 in	Binge	v	Bennett	 (1988:	585),	 the	16	
defendants	tendered	35	affidavits	stating	they	would	not	receive	a	fair	trial.	This	was	due	to	the	
racial	prejudice	in	Goondiwindi—in	part	due	to	Queensland	government	ministers	and	officials	
publicly	impugning	the	defendants—that	would	bias	the	jury	against	the	Indigenous	protesters	
(see	Anon.	1987f:	9,	1987g:	2,	1987h:	10,	1987i:	6).	The	defendants	also	pointed	to	the	absence	
of	Indigenous	people	on	juries	and	jury	panels	in	Queensland,	due	to	jury	list	arrangements	and	
the	 ‘regular	practice’	of	the	Crown	vetting	Indigenous	 jurors	(Binge	v	Bennett	1988:	585).	The	
Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	and,	when	the	matter	was	remitted,	the	Supreme	Court	did	not	accept	
the	defendant’s	perception	that	all‐white	juries	were	unfair.	They	viewed	Indigenous	exclusion	
from	 juries	 in	 Queensland	 as	 a	 product	 of	 an	 impartial	 jury	 selection	 process	 that	 does	 not	
‘discriminate	against	Aboriginal	peoples’,	but	reflects	their	incompatible	‘education,	lifestyle	and	
attitudes’	(Binge	v	Bennett	1988:	598,	Binge	v	Bennett	1989	42	A	Crim	R	93:	105,	107).	The	courts	
upheld	the	position	that	racism	requires	overt	acts—such	as	the	deliberate	vetting	of	Indigenous	
jurors	(Binge	v	Bennett	1988:	598)—that	can	be	seen	by	courts,	and	rejected	the	idea	that	racism	
exists	where	 it	 is	 only	 seen	 by	 Indigenous	 people,	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 racism.	 Related	 to	 this,	
Indigenous	exclusion	from	juries,	according	to	the	courts,	is	due	to	Indigenous	peoples’	deficits	
rather	than	deficits	in	the	legal	system.	
	
The	Australian	Capital	 Territory	 Supreme	Court	 adopted	a	 similar	 reasoning	 in	R	v	Buzzacott	
(2004	149	A	Crim	R	320).	This	case	concerned	58‐year‐old	Kevin	Buzzacott,	an	Arabunna	Elder,	
activist	 and	 law	 custodian	 from	 South	Australia,	who	 lodged	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 all‐white	 jury	
composition.	Buzzacott	was	facing	a	prosecution	for	allegedly	stealing	a	bronze	Coat	of	Arms	from	
outside	Parliament	House	in	Canberra	as	part	of	a	political	protest	on	the	thirtieth	anniversary	of	
the	Aboriginal	Tent	Embassy	in	the	federal	capital5	in	2002	(Anon.	2002a:	12).	Buzzacott	asserted	
that	he	was	exercising	his	claim	of	right	to	take	back	his	peoples’	sacred	totems—the	Emu	and	
the	 Kangaroo—which	 appeared	 on	 the	 Coat	 of	 Arms	 (Anon.	 2002b:	 7;	 Naylor	 2005:	 6).	 The	
Australian	Government	used	the	totem	symbols	without	Aboriginal	consent,	which	is	a	breach	of	
Aboriginal	law,	Buzzacott	contended	(Anon.	2002c:	2,	2005a:	11).	Buzzacott	agreed	to	return	the	
plaque	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 a	meeting	with	 the	 Government	 or	 the	 Crown	was	 arranged	 to	
discuss	national	reconciliation	(Boogs	2002a:	1;	Brook	2002:	2;	Seale	2005:	10;	Taylor	2002:	7).	
Buzzacott	felt	that	he	had	to	take	the	plaque	to	have	his	cause	noticed	by	governments,	explaining	
that	 ‘desperate	 people	 take	 desperate	measures’	 (quoted	 in	Madigan	 2002:	 7;	 see	 also	Anon.	
2002d:	2).	
	
During	the	committal,	Buzzacott	submitted	that	Indigenous	people	had	not	ceded	sovereignty	and	
the	court	had	no	jurisdiction	over	him	(Anon.	2004a:	4).	Furthermore,	a	white	jury	would	not	
ensure	a	fair	trial	(R	v	Buzzacott	2004:	327).	Buzzacott	maintained	that	white	jurors	would	be	
biased	against	him	and	his	cause,	and	he	had	a	right	to	a	jury	of	peers,	which	would	comprise	
Indigenous	 Elders.	 Buzzacott	 pointed	 to	 the	 adverse	 media	 publicity	 around	 the	 case	 and	
explained	that	white	people	would	not	understand	the	Aboriginal	justice	issues	before	the	court.	
His	counsel	noted:	
	
Given	 the	 level	 of	 ignorance	 of	 Aboriginal	 Justice	 issues	 in	 the	 non‐Aboriginal	
community—and	 the	 level	 of	 hatred	 of	Aboriginal	Rights	 in	 the	non‐Aboriginal	
community—and	the	nationwide	saturation	media	publicity	on	the	coat	of	arms	
theft	 shock	 horror	 by	 the	 non‐Aboriginal	 community,	 it	 will	 be	 impossible	 for	
Kevin	Buzzacott,	Arabunna,	 to	 receive	a	 fair	 trial	 from	a	 jury	of	non	Aborigines	
[sic].	(R	v	Buzzacott	2004:	327)	
	
Indicative	of	white	responses	to	Buzzacott’s	alleged	theft	were	not	only	the	adverse	media	reports	
(see	Bolt	2002:	19;	Boogs	2002b;	Probyn	2002:	20)	but	also	condemning	letters	by	the	public	in	
national	newspapers.	One	letter	stated,	‘IF	the	Aborigines	want	to	take	“their”	animals	off	the	coat	
of	arms,	do	it.	And	what	if	we	take	all	their	money	back,	too?	It’s	white	Australians’	money’	(Cook	
2002:	18).	Another	reader	wrote,	‘WHO	does	Kevin	Buzzacott	think	he	is	fooling?	His	ancestors,	
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if	he	is	a	full‐blooded	Aborigine,	ate	kangaroos	and	emus’	(Peyton	2002:	18).	Van	Order	(2002:	
16)	commented,	‘KANGAROOS	and	emus	are	not	Aboriginal	objects,	they're	Australian	animals.	I	
am	an	Australian	and	not	an	invader.	Kevin	Buzzacott,	get	real!’	Finally,	a	letter	mocked	Buzzacott	
by	claiming	$20,000	compensation	from	him	because	Buzzacott’s	totems	hit	his	vehicle	(Fauser	
2002:	32).		
	
The	Supreme	Court	did	not	perceive	the	potential	for	a	white	jury	to	be	prejudicial	against	Kevin	
Buzzacott.	 It	 reasoned	 that	 the	 jury	panel	was	 assembled	by	 ‘the	normal	 random	process	 for	
choosing	 jurors’	 from	 the	 electoral	 roll,	 which	 was	 the	 mechanism	 for	 ensuring	 a	 broadly	
representative	jury	(R	v	Buzzacott	2004:	327‐328).	The	Court	held	that	‘the	right	to	trial	by	a	jury	
of	one’s	peers	does	not	mean	that	an	accused	person	can	demand	that	the	jury	panel	be	comprised	
solely	of	persons	of	a	particular	racial,	ethnic,	social	or	gender	group’	(R	v	Buzzacott	2004:	327).	
It	failed	to	consider	Buzzacott’s	perception	that	his	peoples’	continuing	sovereignty	could	not	be	
understood	by	white	people’s	worldviews,	or	the	prejudicial	role	that	the	media	played	in	relation	
to	the	trial.	Rather,	the	Court	maintained	that	to	override	a	legislative	process	that	produces	a	
racially	 neutral	 outcome	would	 be	 racially	 discriminatory.6	 Rakhi	 Ruparelia	 (2013:	 298)	 has	
identified	this	reasoning	in	Canada	where	courts	reject	defendants’	claims	of	racial	bias	because	
it	threatens	the	‘dominant	cultural	scripts’	of	racial	invisibility.	Instead,	courts	regard	coloured	
peoples’	challenges	to	 jurors	or	 juries	based	on	race	as	 ‘racist’	because	it	makes	hidden	racial	
issues	visible.	
	
The	Victorian	Court	of	Appeal	 in	 its	2004	case	of	R	v	Badenoch	 (2004	VSCA	95)	also	denied	a	
challenge	to	the	array	of	a	white	jury	because	of	its	racist	implications.	In	this	case,	an	Indigenous	
defendant	from	Mildura,	in	inland	Victoria,	contended	that	the	absence	of	an	Indigenous	person	
on	the	jury,	despite	the	substantial	proportion	of	Indigenous	people	in	Mildura,	meant	that	the	
jury	was	unrepresentative	and	the	trial	would	be	unfair	(R	v	Badenoch	2004:	 [66]).	The	court	
stated	that	the	lack	of	Indigenous	representation	did	not	inhibit	a	fair	trial	for	the	applicant	(R	v	
Badenoch	2004:	[66]).	Rather,	selection	based	on	‘some	ethnic	or	other	discriminatory	criteria’	
would	have	‘terrible	consequences’	for	fair	trials	(R	v	Badenoch	2004:	[68]).	This	characterisation	
redirects	the	judicial	inquiry	from	the	racism	perceived	by	the	Indigenous	defendant	and	towards	
the	 racism	 of	 the	 Indigenous	 defendant.	 Courts	 fail	 to	 ask	 why	 an	 Indigenous	 person	 would	
perceive	an	all‐white	jury	as	racist,	which	reflects	the	‘majoritarian	privilege	of	never	noticing’	
oneself	as	culturally	partial	(Williams	1997:	7).	
	
The	Victorian	Court	of	Appeal	 in	R	v	Badenoch	upheld	 the	 trial	 judge’s	view	 in	dismissing	 the	
Indigenous	defendant’s	perception	of	racism.	It	asserted	that	the	jury	is	colour‐blind,	irrespective	
of	the	fact	it	is	all‐white	or	comprised	of	any	other	cultural	groups.	This	is	because	everyone	is	a	
member	of	the	same	Australian	community:	
	
Whether	you’re	an	Aboriginal	Australian	or	a	European	Australian	or	a	Turkish	
Australian,	 you’re	 an	 Australian,	 you’re	 part	 of	 the	 panel,	 you’re	 part	 of	 the	
community.	(R	v	Badenoch	2004:	[67])		
	
In	the	cases	mentioned	above,	the	courts	regularly	refer	to	the	judgment	in	R	v	Grant	&	Lovett	
(1972	VR	423),	which	addresses	both	issues	of	Aboriginal	and	class	background.	Trevor	Sydney	
Lovett,	an	Aboriginal	 labourer,	made	a	challenge	to	the	array	 for	not	empaneling	any	working	
class	or	Aboriginal	persons	despite	calling	126	jurors	for	the	panel,	which	created	the	appearance	
that	the	jury	was	‘not	chosen	indifferently’	nor	was	‘indifferent	or	unpartisan’	(R	v	Grant	&	Lovett	
1972:	 424).	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 Victorian	 Supreme	 Court	 held	 that	 legislative	 compliance	 in	
assembling	a	jury	list	and	summonsing	jurors	for	service	met	the	requirements	for	lawful	jury	
empanelment.	Where	random	selection	results	in	a	panel	that	is	weighted	towards	a	pattern	of	
occupation	or	cultural	background,	there	cannot	be	a	‘challenge	to	the	array’	of	the	jury	unless	it	
is	due	to	‘some	deliberate	contriving	of	the	sheriff’	or	breach	of	duty	(R	v	Grant	&	Lovett	1972:	
425).	This	requirement	of	explicit	bias	and	deliberate	manipulation	sets	a	high	bar	for	proof	of	
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prejudice.	It	disregards	the	Indigenous	person’s	notion	of	what	bias	looks	like	even	where	the	
system	is	upholding	the	order	of	 things;	 indeed,	because	the	system	is	upholding	the	order	of	
things.	
	
Finally,	the	most	recent	case,	in	2010,	saw	Graham	Woods	and	Julian	Williams	challenge	the	jury	
array	due	to	the	disproportionality	of	white	people	on	juries	in	Alice	Springs.	They	believed	that	
white	jurors	would	be	biased	again	them	because	of	local	racial	prejudices,	which	had	been	fueled	
by	media	reports	that	slandered	Indigenous	people	for	violence	in	Alice	Springs	(see	Goldflam	
2011b:	2).	This	negative	publicity	had	been	directed	to	Woods’	and	Williams’	alleged	murder	of	a	
well‐known	white	man,	Edward	Hargraves.7	The	applicants	in	R	v	Woods	&	Williams	(2010	NTSC	
69)	pointed	to	the	vast	and	systemic	under‐representation	of	Indigenous	jurors	in	Alice	Springs,	
including	by	virtue	of	a	25	per	cent	disqualification	of	jurors	who	had	served	a	prison	sentence.	
The	Full	Supreme	Court	of	the	Northern	Territory	Court	rejected	this	evidence,	stating	that	it	did	
not	indicate	the	proportion	of	Indigenous	people	affected	by	this	disqualification	(R	v	Woods	&	
Williams	 2010:	 [48]),	 notwithstanding	 that	 it	 would	 have	 been	 in	 the	 court’s	 capacity	 to	
substantiate	the	evidence	(Horan	2012:	33).	 It	maintained	that	 the	 jury	empanelment	process	
prevented	prejudice	because	it	was	based	on	random	selection	(R	v	Woods	&	Williams	2010:	[62]).	
So	long	as	the	juror	could	follow	judicial	direction	and	act	on	the	evidence,	impartiality	would	be	
secured	(Woods	&	Williams	v	The	Queen	2010	NTSC	36:	[13]).	The	Northern	Territory	Supreme	
Court	 held	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 Indigenous	 jurors	 was	 not	 racially	 determined,	 but	 a	 product	 of	
impartial	jury	selection	that	would	be	disrupted	if	racial	challenges	were	allowed:	
	
To	impose	some	overriding	requirement	to	the	effect	that	a	jury,	once	randomly	
selected	 in	 this	way,	has	 to	be	 racially	balanced	or	proportionate	would	be	 the	
antithesis	of	an	impartially	selected	jury.	(R	v	Woods	&	Williams	2010:	[59])	
	
This	 faith	 that	 the	 legislative	 requirements	 for	 the	 empaneling	 of	 a	 jury	 would	 give	 rise	 to	
impartiality	ignores	Indigenous	concerns	that	all‐white	juries	which	they	commonly	face	in	the	
Northern	 Territory—notwithstanding	 that	 the	 Indigenous	 population	 is	 30	 per	 cent	 and	 the	
Indigenous	prison	population	is	84	per	cent—will	not	produce	an	outcome	in	their	favour.	This	
perception	is	especially	strong	where	the	victim	is	non‐Indigenous	and	there	is	publicised	racism	
against	the	defendant	and	his	or	her	Indigenous	community.	The	courts	consider	‘distortions	in	
social	relations’	as	‘neutral	and	fair’,	no	matter	how	‘unequal	and	unjust’	they	are	in	substance,	to	
use	Harris’	terms	(1993:	1768).	This	‘legitimate	order	of	things’	cannot	‘legitimately	be	disturbed’	
(Harris	1993:	1768).	
	
Because	Australian	courts,	rather	than	the	victims	of	racism,	have	claimed	to	be	the	authority	on	
what	racism	looks	like	(namely,	the	existence	of	overt	racist	acts),	they	do	not	pursue	inquiries	
into	why	the	Indigenous	defendant	perceives	bias	when	presented	with	an	all‐white	jury	and	how	
this	may	 relate	 to	 racial	 divisions	 outside	 the	 courtroom.8	 This	 lack	 of	 inquiry	 reinforces	 the	
colour‐blindness	of	the	system	and	escalates	Indigenous	community	perceptions	of	jurors’	racial	
prejudice.	This	section	has	demonstrated	that	whiteness	is	upheld	by	the	courts	in	three	respects.	
First,	 courts	 claim	 that	 the	 jury	 system	 accommodates	 cultural	 diversity	 through	 formal	
mechanisms.	 Second,	 courts	 regard	 Indigenous	 exclusion	 as	 a	 natural	 consequence	 of	 non‐
Indigenous	people	being	better	placed	 to	 serve	on	 juries	and	 Indigenous	deficit	 in	 ‘education,	
lifestyle	and	attitudes’	(Binge	v	Bennett	1989	42	A	Crim	R	93:	105).	Third,	courts	perceive	the	
legislated	 jury	 process	 as	 giving	 rise	 to	 impartiality.	 These	whiteness‐privileging	 approaches	
normalise	 whiteness	 and	 treat	 it	 as	 preferable.	 According	 to	 Moreton‐Robinson	 (2004:	 75),	
whiteness	is	based	on	an	‘an	invisible	regime	of	power’	that	is	secured	through	discourse	and	a	
priori	claims	to	law	and	governance.	The	white	epistemology	of	Australian	courts	is	brought	into	
sharp	 relief	 when	 compared	 to	 Canadian	 and	 United	 States	 judicial	 approaches.	 In	 the	 latter	
jurisdictions,	 individual	 jurors	 can	 be	 confronted	 on	 their	 racial	 prejudice	 in	 peremptory	
challenges	and	challenges	for	cause.	However,	this	has	not	resulted	in	upholding	challenges	to	the	
array	due	to	an	absence	of	non‐white	jurors.	
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Canada	and	the	United	States:	Interrogating	visible	juror	racism		
While,	in	Australia,	challenges	for	cause	are	exceptional	because	there	is	a	lack	of	information	on	
juror	 prejudice	 (McCrimmon	 2000:	 137),9	 in	 Canada	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 they	 are	 routine.	
Challenges	 to	 individual	 jurors	 are	 informed	 by	 the	 trial	 judge,	 defence	 or	 prosecution	
questioning	all	12	jurors	on	racial	prejudice	at	the	pre‐trial	stage.	This	process	seeks	to	gauge	
‘hidden	bias’	 (Brown	2000:	478;	Weems	1984:	344).	To	be	successful,	 challenges	 for	 cause	 in	
Canada	merely	require	an	‘air	of	reality’	of	potential	bias	(Alberta	Law	Reform	Institute	2007:	4;	
R	v	Sherratt	[1991]	1	SCR	509:	536).	In	Australia	questioning	jurors	for	partiality	is	not	available	
during	 a	 peremptory	 challenge,	 whereas	 in	 the	 United	 States	 there	 is	 a	 right	 to	 voir	 dire	
prospective	jurors	in	the	exercise	of	peremptory	challenges	(Hands	and	Williams	2010:	59).	The	
questioning	 process,	 nonetheless,	 tends	 to	 be	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 overt	 racism	 rather	 than	
implicit	bias.	Despite	this	divergent	approach	in	challenges	for	cause	and	peremptory	challenges,	
judicial	attitudes	converge	across	the	three	 jurisdictions	 in	relation	to	challenges	to	the	array.	
They	all	uphold	the	legitimacy	of	a	legislated	selection	process	that	produces	an	all‐white	jury.		
	
Canadian	challenges	for	cause	based	on	racial	prejudice	
Racial	prejudice	is	grounds	for	challenging	jurors	for	cause	in	Canada,	following	the	decision	of	R	
v	Parks	(1993	I5	OR	(3rd)	324	(CA)).	Counsel	can	question	jurors	on	racial	biases	that	might	affect	
their	partiality	and,	if	a	juror	exhibits	bias,	she	or	he	can	be	excluded	from	the	jury.	However,	for	
such	 questioning	 to	 proceed,	 the	 court	 must	 accept	 the	 accused’s	 evidence	 that	 widespread	
racism	exists	in	the	relevant	community	(Ruparelia	2013:	283).	This	has	had	the	effect	of	denying	
juror	questioning	where	there	is	a	perception	of	low‐levels	of	white	racism,	including	due	to	the	
existence	of	a	relatively	small	but	sizeable	(between	6.9	and	10	per	cent)	First	Nations	population	
in	the	local	community	(R	v	Denison	[1998]	BCJ	No	3285	(QL)	(BC	SC):	[14],	cited	in	Ruparelia	
2013:	284).	Criticising	this	type	of	interpretation,	McLachlin	J	remarked	in	R	v	Williams	(1996,	
106	CCC	(3d)	215	(BC	CA):	[22])	that	this	does	not	come	to	terms	with	deeply	ingrained	racism	
that	is	not	readily	discernible	and	which	cannot	be	remedied	with	‘instructions	from	the	judge	or	
other	safeguards’	after	jury	selection.	The	judge	suggests	that	‘the	better	policy	is	to	err	on	the	
side	of	caution	and	permit	[jury]	prejudices	to	be	examined’	(R	v	Williams	1996:	[22]).	
	
An	additional	condition	 for	challenging	 jurors	on	 the	grounds	of	 racial	prejudice,	which	 flows	
from	the	Parks	decision,	is	that	jurors	demonstrate	an	awareness	of	their	racist	attitudes	and	a	
willingness	to	acknowledge	them	in	public	(Petersen	1993:	169;	Roach	2013:	418,	2015:	213).	
Current	forms	of	juror	questioning	in	Canada	do	not	uncover	subconscious	or	implicit	racism,10	
and	only	‘weed	out	overtly	racist	jurors’	(Ruparelia	2013:	269).	Jurors	who	may	not	be	critical	of	
cultural	 minorities	 may,	 nonetheless,	 have	 contrary	 worldviews	 that	 prejudice	 them	 against	
minorities.	Despite	this	limitation,	there	are	grounds	for	extending	this	questioning	procedure	in	
jury	selection	to	Australia.	McCrimmon	(2000:	143)	notes	that	‘one	thing	is	certain:	if	potential	
jurors	are	not	questioned,	lack	of	impartiality	cannot	be	exposed’.	
	
Canada:	Failure	of	challenges	to	the	array	of	all‐white	juries	
In	Canada,	like	Australia,	there	is	an	over‐representation	of	Indigenous	people	as	defendants	and	
victims	in	courts	and	yet	a	substantial	under‐representation	of	Indigenous	jurors	(Peterson	1993:	
149;	 Sheley	 2016:	 1).	 This	 has	 led	 to	 perceptions	 that	 fair	 trials	 will	 not	 be	 guaranteed	 for	
Indigenous	people	who	tend	to	be	tried	by	predominantly	white	jurors.	Nishnawbi	Aski	Deputy	
Grand	 Chief	 Alvin	Fiddler,	 who	 intervened	 in	 the	 Kokopenace	 case,	 recently	 articulated	 this	
perception:		
	
It’s	 our	 community	 members	 that	 are	 filling	 those	 jails.	 It’s	 our	 community	
members	that	are	interacting	with	the	police,	and	yet	in	terms	of	being	part	of	the	
justice	system,	they’re	not	there.	(Fiddler	quoted	in	Porter	2015)	
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Reasons	for	widespread	white	juries	include	disqualification	of	persons	with	a	criminal	record,	
which	has	a	disproportionate	impact	on	persons	of	colour	(see	Iacobucci	2013:	[33];	Sheley	2016:	
1;	Tanovich	2008:	662‐663).	In	the	Canadian	case	of	R	v	Kokopenace	(2013	ONCA	389),	the	First	
Nations	defendant	challenged	the	array	of	a	 jury	based	on	its	racial	composition.	Despite	First	
Nations	reserve	residents	constituting	over	30	per	cent	of	 the	 local	population,	 there	were	no	
First	Nations	people	on	Kokopenace’s	jury.	This	was	attributed	inter	alia	to	First	Nations	people	
not	being	able	to	receive	jury	summons	because	they	were	sent	to	anonymous	post	office	boxes	
on	reserves	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[19]‐[20]).	Clifford	Kokopenace	alleged	that	the	process	for	
selecting	the	jury	had	not	‘ensured	representative	inclusion	of	Aboriginal	on‐reserve	residents’	
(R	v	Kokopenace	2013:	[2]),	thus	violating	the	right	to	a	representative	and	impartial	jury	under	
the	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms	s	11	(Constitution	Act	1982	(CA),	Pt	I)	and	the	Juries	
Act,	RSO	1990	(CA)	c.	J.3.	The	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	it	was	relevant	that	there	had	not	
been	‘reasonable	efforts	to	seek	to	provide	a	fair	opportunity	for	the	distinctive	perspectives	of	
Aboriginal	on‐reserve	residents’	(R	v	Kokopenace	2013:	[50]).	Therefore,	the	jury	was	‘improperly	
constituted’	and	it	could	not	‘serve	as	the	conscience	of	the	community’	(R	v	Kokopenace	2013:	
[2],	[31],	[50],	[277]).	The	issue	of	under‐representation	of	First	Nations	jurors	provoked	a	review	
of	 this	 problem	 (Iacobucci	 2013).	 Ensuing	 recommendations	 focused	 on	 addressing	 practical	
problems	in	the	jury	notification	system	as	well	as	the	‘fundamental	systemic’	barriers	to	First	
Nations	participation	(Iacobucci	2013:	[44],	[56])	
	
Nonetheless,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	R	v	Kokopenace	([2015]	2	SCR	398)	overturned	this	
ruling	 following	 a	 Crown	 appeal.	 The	 Majority	 espoused	 a	 similar	 reasoning	 to	 Australian	
Supreme	Courts,	by	conceiving	that	‘jury	representativeness’	was	assured	through	the	process	of	
compiling	the	jury	list	and	‘not	its	ultimate	composition’	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[2],	[40],	[158]).	
The	 Court	 recognised	 that	 First	 Nations	 peoples	 were	 unable	 to	 receive	 jury	 summons	 on	
reserves	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[19]‐[20])	but,	nonetheless,	considered	that	the	state	had	made	
reasonable	efforts	to	compile	the	jury	list	and	to	deliver	notices	without	the	‘deliberate	exclusion’	
of	First	Nations	people	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[66]).	This	requirement	for	deliberate	exclusion	to	
ground	a	successful	challenge	accords	with	the	2015	decision	of	the	Edmonton	Court	of	Queen’s	
Bench.	It	denied	a	challenge	by	First	Nations	man	Jeremy	Newborn	to	an	all‐white	jury	on	the	
basis	 that	 the	Alberta	 legislation	 unconstitutionally	 excluded	 jurors	 for	 possessing	 a	 criminal	
record,	which	had	a	disproportionate	impact	on	First	Nations	people.	The	Court	determined	that	
there	 was	 no	 evidence	 of	 deliberate	 discrimination	 and	 that	 excluding	 jurors	 with	 criminal	
records	was	nonetheless	 ‘reasonable	and	acceptable’	 to	prevent	partiality	 (R	v	Newborn,	2016	
ABQB	13:	[30]).	
	
Returning	to	the	judgment	in	R	v	Kokopenace	(2015:	[140]),	the	Supreme	Court	also	declined	to	
consider	how	underlying	social	 issues	contribute	 to	 the	under‐representation	of	First	Nations	
jurors	or	how	the	under‐representation	created	an	appearance	of	prejudice.	Beyond	providing	a	
‘fair	opportunity’	for	broad	jury	participation	through	reasonable	compiling	of	the	jury	roll,	there	
was	no	right	to	a	representative	jury	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[2]).11	The	Supreme	Court	held	that	
a	successful	challenge	required	the	state’s	efforts	in	delivering	jury	notices	to	be	‘so	deficient’	that	
it	created	the	appearance	of	partiality	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[50]).	Merely	failing	to	send	jury	
notices	to	specific	addresses	did	not	constitute	such	a	deficiency.	Cromwell	J	in	dissent	regarded	
that	the	state	perpetuated	‘systemic	problems’	facing	Indigenous	people	in	the	justice	system	and,	
by	‘turning	a	blind	eye’,	it	failed	to	make	‘reasonable	efforts’	to	overcome	them,	which	placed	it	in	
breach	of	the	accused’s	right	to	a	representative	jury	(R	v	Kokopenace	2015:	[285]‐[286]).		
	
United	States	Supreme	Court	rejection	of	racial	exclusion	in	peremptory	challenges		
In	the	United	States,	the	jurisprudence	covers	applications	to	dissolve	juries	where	prosecutorial	
peremptory	 challenges	 have	 excluded	 jurors	 from	 an	 ethnic	 minority,	 particularly	 African	
Americans.	These	challenges	to	the	array	resonate	with	the	Australian	case	of	R	v	Smith	(1981),	
detailed	above,	where	the	judge	discharged	the	jury	due	to	the	appearance	of	prejudice	when	the	
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prosecution	excluded	all	Indigenous	jurors.	The	United	States	Supreme	Court	has	held	that	the	
use	of	peremptory	challenges	to	exclude	non‐white	jurors	is	discriminatory	and	unlawful.	In	the	
1970s,	 prosecutors	 peremptorily	 challenged	 approximately	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 African	 American	
jurors	in	parts	of	Missouri	(see	United	States	v	Carter,	528	F	2d	844,	848	(CA	8	1975)),	Louisiana	
(see	United	Sates	v	McDaniels,	379	F	Supp	1243	(ED	La	1974))	and	South	Carolina	(see	McKinney	
v	Walker,	394	F	Supp	1015,	1017‐1018	(SC	1974)).		
	
Following	the	Supreme	Court	decision	of	Batson	v	Kentucky	(1986	476	US	79),	courts	accept	that	
the	use	of	peremptory	challenges	to	ensure	a	certain	race	participation	in	the	jurors	is	a	violation	
of	 the	Constitution	 and	 is	 prohibited	 in	 court	proceedings.	 The	Batson	v	Kentucky	 (1986:	 84)	
ruling	proclaimed	that	 the	 ‘deliberate	denial	 to	Negroes	on	account	of	race	of	participation	as	
jurors	in	the	administration	of	justice	violated	the	Equal	Protection	Clause’.	It	was	concerned	to	
identify	‘purposeful	discrimination’	in	which	‘a	court	must	undertake	a	sensitive	inquiry	into	such	
circumstantial	and	direct	evidence	of	intent	as	may	be	available’	(Batson	v	Kentucky	1986:	93).	
Consequently,	prosecutors	who	peremptorily	strike	out	a	non‐white	juror	must	demonstrate	that	
it	was	for	race‐neutral	reasons,	where	the	defendant	alleges	racial	motivation.	However,	Amdur	
(2015)	 states	 that	 judges	 tend	 to	 accept	 prosecutors’	 reasons	 except	 in	 the	 most	 ‘egregious	
strikes’.	 These	 can	 include	because	 the	non‐white	 juror	 is	 ‘too	young,	 too	old,	married,	 single,	
uneducated,	too	educated,	employed,	unemployed’,	which	Amdur	(2015)	describes	as	‘farcical’.	It	
perpetuates	 the	 disproportionate	 strikes	 to	 African	 Americans	 jurors	 compared	 with	 white	
jurors,	with	 the	disparity	 in	 some	states	such	as	Louisiana	being	as	high	as	 threefold	 (Grosso	
2012:	1539).		
	
In	a	recent	case	of	an	egregious	strike	(Foster	v	Chatman,	Warden	(2016)	578	US),	the	Supreme	
Court	upheld	 its	decision	 in	Batson	v	Kentucky	 (1986).	Timothy	Foster	was	accused	of	 capital	
murder	 in	Georgia.	Before	his	trial,	 the	prosecutor	struck	all	 four	prospective	African	American	
jurors	 (Foster	 v	Chatman	2016:	 3).	Defence	 lawyers	 discovered	prosecution	 files	 that	 included	
notes	on	jury	selection	that	explicitly	pointed	to	the	race	of	all	African	American	jurors	as	grounds	
for	striking	them	(Foster	v	Chatman	2016:	5).	The	Supreme	Court	held	that	Foster	had	established	
‘purposeful	discrimination’	and	that	the	prosecutor’s	race‐neutral	reasons	were	merely	pre‐textual	
(Foster	v	Chatman	2016:	23).	However,	in	the	absence	of	evidence	of	the	explicit	race	motivation	of	
prosecutors,	the	judgment	does	not	provide	safeguards	to	prevent	the	striking	of	non‐white	jurors	
for	ostensibly	race‐neutral	reasons.		
	
United	States	voir	dire	of	jurors	for	prejudice		
In	the	United	States	the	voir	dire	provides	a	defendant	or	the	prosecution	and/or	the	judge	an	
opportunity	to	question	jurors	for	the	possibility	of	racial	prejudice	(see	Turner	v	Murray	(1986)	
476	US	28:	36‐37).	Questioning	prospective	jurors	upholds	the	‘petitioner’s	constitutional	right	
to	an	impartial	jury’	(Turner	v	Murray	1986:	36).	Parties	seek	to	identify	bias	among	individual	
jurors	 to	 inform	 their	 exercise	 of	 peremptory	 challenges	 or	 challenges	 for	 cause,	 rather	 than	
relying	on	stereotypes	to	disqualify	jurors	(Lyon	2012:	765‐767).	The	voir	dire	is	also	a	vehicle	
for	prompting	jurors	to	‘think	more	critically	about	[racial]	issues’	by	planting	seeds	in	the	minds	
of	 jurors	 that	 the	defendant’s	minority	 race	could	be	part	of	 the	 reason	 that	 they	are	accused	
(Grine	and	Coward	2014:	8‐9).	Therefore,	in	the	United	States,	the	voir	dire	is	an	opportunity	to	
confront	 the	 issues	 of	 implicit	 bias	 and	 race	 salience	 (calling	 attention	 to	 race)	 as	 part	 of	 an	
educative	and	self‐awareness	process	for	prospective	jurors	(Lee	2015:	846‐847),	which	studies	
suggest	reduce	juror’s	racial	bias	(see	Schuller	et	al.	2009;	Sommers	and	Ellsworth	2003:	1027).	
Lee	(2015:	847)	argues	that	it	is	more	useful	to	do	this	during	the	voir	dire	rather	than	‘waiting	
until	 just	 before	 the	 jury	 deliberates’	 to	 undo	 the	 effects	 of	 racial	 bias	 in	 the	 trial	 (see	 also	
Sommers	and	Ellsworth	2001:	210).	
	
The	need	to	confront	jurors	on	racial	bias	has	been	an	issue	in	relation	to	the	trials	emerging	from	
the	protests	against	racist	police	violence	in	Ferguson,	Missouri	on	9	August	2014.	The	uprising	
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was	 in	response	 to	 the	shooting	of	18‐year‐old	Michael	Brown,	an	unarmed	African	American	
teenager,	by	a	white	police	officer,	28‐year‐old	Darren	Wilson.	The	killing	brought	forward	a	deep	
racial	division	in	society	 that	was	reflected	in	the	 ‘diametrically	opposed	accounts’	 in	national	
debates	(Lee	2015:	843).	One	was	that	Officer	Wilson	shot	Brown	for	no	reason	and	continued	
shooting	after	Brown	turned	around	with	his	hands	in	the	air,	which	was	confirmed	by	Brown’s	
friend	and	witness,	Dorian	Johnson.	The	other	was	that	Officer	Wilson	shot	Brown	in	self‐defence	
after	a	scuffle,	which	was	Wilson’s	version.	Polls	taken	shortly	after	the	shooting	showed	a	racial	
divide	in	public	opinion	over	whether	the	officer	was	justified	in	shooting	Brown,	with	57	per	
cent	of	African	Americans	saying	they	believed	the	shooting	was	unjustified	and	only	18	per	cent	
of	whites	 sharing	 this	 opinion	 (Lee	 2015:	 844).	When	protests	 erupted	 in	 Ferguson	 over	 the	
shooting,	the	police	responded	with	a	heavy‐handed	display	of	force	and,	again,	‘public	opinion	
was	split	over	whether	the	protesters	or	the	police	acted	inappropriately’	(Lee	2015:	844).		
	
Following	the	Ferguson	incidents,	scholars	and	practitioners	have	come	out	to	advocate	for	race	
salience	during	the	voir	dire	for	the	Ferguson	protesters.12	In	order	to	help	flush	out	juror	bias	
against	the	African	American	defendants,	they	implored	lawyers	and	judges	to	interrogate	jurors	
for	unconscious	racial	bias	(Brayer	2015:	164,	166).	They	recognised	that	juries	are	not	immune	
from	views	about	police	 relations	with	African	Americans	 and	 silence	on	 race	can	perpetuate	
juror	racism:	
	
If	 the	 defense	 lawyer	 does	 not	 mention	 race	 during	 jury	 selection	 when	 race	
matters	in	a	case,	racial	bias	can	be	a	corrosive	factor	eating	away	at	any	chance	of	
fairness	for	the	client.	(Joy	2015:	180)	
	
Interrogating	jurors	for	implicit	bias	requires	something	other	than	an	unhelpful	closed‐ended	
question	 like,	 ‘Are	 you	 going	 to	 be	 biased	 against	 the	 defendant	 because	 of	 his	 race?’	 Direct	
questions	fail	to	uncover	deep‐seated,	hidden	biases	that	inform	perceptions	of	Ferguson	and	are	
linked	to	national	anxieties	surrounding	the	tragedy	of	Michael	Brown.	(Forman	2015:	171‐172).	
Hidden	bias	can	be	better	exposed	in	the	jury	selection	phase	through	‘a	series	of	open‐ended	
questions	educating	jurors	about	implicit	bias’	that	encourage	jurors	‘to	reflect	upon	whether	and	
how	implicit	racial	bias	might	affect	their	ability	to	even‐handedly	consider	the	evidence’	(Lee	
2015:	846‐847).	
	
Conclusion:	From	Ferguson	to	Kalgoorlie	–	the	need	to	address	jury	prejudice		
It	has	been	widely	stated	that	a	‘trial	is	won	or	lost	when	the	jury	is	selected’	because	‘jurors	bring	
to	the	courtroom	biases	and	predispositions	which	largely	determine	the	outcome	of	the	case’	
(Covington	 1985:	 576,	 quoted	 in	 Lee	 2015:	 847).	 This	 reflects	 the	 sentiment	 of	 Indigenous	
defendants	and	Indigenous	victims	of	white	perpetrators	when	their	trials	are	adjudicated	by	an	
all‐white	jury.	While	the	Canadian	and	United	States	jury	selection	processes	reflect	an	awareness	
of	 the	 effects	 of	 racial	 bias	 on	 jurors,	 and	 have	 put	 in	 place	 some	 safeguards,	 they	 have	 not	
redressed	this	through	setting	aside	the	array	of	all‐white	juries.	There	are,	nonetheless,	lessons	
to	be	learnt	from	their	procedures	of	questioning	jurors	on	racial	bias,	which	recognise	that	racial	
fault	lines	outside	the	courthouse	seep	into	the	jury	room.		
	
These	racial	 fault	 lines	are	 just	as	apparent	 in	Australia,	as	highlighted	 in	 the	cases	of	Binge	v	
Bennett	(1988,	1989)	and	R	v	Buzzacott	(2004),	and	relating	to	the	pending	trials	of	protesters	
charged	in	Kalgoorlie,	Western	Australia	following	the	killing	of	Indigenous	boy	Elijah	Doughty	
by	a	white	man	who	rammed	his	vehicle	into	Elijah.	In	Kalgoorlie,	a	division	has	emerged	due	to	
white	vigilantism,	which	encourages	the	‘hunting	down’	of	Indigenous	children	so	they	won’t	be	
able	to	‘breed	again’	(quoted	in	Purtill	2016;	see	also	Menagh	2016;	Stockwell	2016).	Vigilantes	
accuse	Indigenous	children	of	stealing	their	property	on	their	Facebook	page	‘Kalgoorlie	Crimes	
Whinge	and	Whine’,	and	applaud	the	killing	of	Elijah	(for	example,	‘[a]bout	time	someone	took	it	
into	their	own	hands	hope	it	happens	again’;	quoted	in	Purtill	2016;	also	see	Tomlin	2016).	In	
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opposition	 to	 this	 vigilantism,	protesters	have	 rallied	 around	 the	#JusticeForElijah	 tag,	which	
built	on	the	momentum	of	Ferguson	and	the	#BlackLivesMatter	movement.	Indigenous	justice	
(‘just	us’)	advocates	have	drawn	attention	to	the	racially‐inspired	killing	of	Elijah	and	highlight	
the	racism	in	mainstream	media	outlets	and	social	media,	which	wrongly	accuse	Elijah	of	stealing	
the	bike	he	was	riding	when	killed	(Bainbridge	2016;	Behrendt	2016).		
	
The	 Indigenous	 community	 have	 raised	 fears	 about	 white	 juries	 adjudicating	 the	 cases	 of	
Indigenous	 protesters	 who	 were	 rallying	 against	 the	 racist	 killing	 of	 Elijah,	 regarding	 it	 as	
impossible	that	they	will	be	heard	by	an	impartial	jury.	For	Kalgoorlie’s	Indigenous	community,	
the	 failings	 of	 a	 white	 jury	 is	 apparent	 in	 the	 injustice	 of	 their	 not‐guilty	 verdicts	 for	 white	
assailants	responsible	 for	 the	deaths	of	14‐year‐old	Elijah	Doughty,	16‐year‐old	 John	Pat	 from	
Roeburne,	 Western	 Australia	 (1983)	 and	 Mulrunji	 Doomadgee	 on	 Palm	 Island,	 Queensland	
(2007)	(Editors	2016;	Jensen	2017;	Wahlquist	2016;	also	see	Purdy	1994:	42).	The	protesters	
were	charged	with	disorderly	conduct,	property	damage	and	assault	of	police	(Anon.	2016b;	NITV	
News	2016).	The	media	and	Western	Australian	Government	characterise	the	protest	as	a	‘race	
riot’,	‘lynch	mob	justice’	and	‘chaos’	(Anon.	2016a;	Menagh	2016;	Perpitch	and	Bembridge	2016).	
Perhaps	symbolic	of	their	fears	of	jury	bias,	protesters	targeted	the	jury	room	of	the	Kalgoorlie	
courthouse	 (Wahlquist	 2016).	 This	 division	 highlights	 the	 need	 to	 confront	 jurors	 on	 racial	
prejudice.		
	
However,	weeding	out	individual	white	jurors	alone	is	unlikely	to	nullify	Indigenous	perceptions	
of	all‐white	jury	prejudice.	By	rejecting	challenges	to	the	array	of	all‐white	juries	across	Australia,	
the	United	States	and	Canada,	courts	maintain	the	whiteness	of	the	jury	institution	and	colour‐
blind	assumptions	that	jury	selection	processes	are	neutral	and	fair	for	Indigenous	people.	They	
fail	to	address	the	appearance	of	partiality	against	Indigenous	defendants,	and	Indigenous	victims	
of	a	white	accused,	that	flows	from	the	systemic	underrepresentation	of	non‐white	jurors	on	jury	
panels.	By	dismissing	the	possibility	of	unconscious	bias,	courts	reinforce	the	racial	 fault	 lines	
that	systemically	favour	white	people.		
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1	The	authors	would	like	to	thank	Alison	Whittaker,	Ashleigh	Best,	Heidi	Keikbosh‐Fitt	and	Amber	Boatman	for	their	
research,	and	the	2016	Criminal	Law	workshop	participants	and	anonymous	referees	for	their	helpful	feedback	on	
this	article.	
2	The	white	accused	who	caused	the	death	Elijah	Doughty	was	found	not	guilty	of	manslaughter	by	a	white	jury	in	July	
2017	(Anon.	2017;	Jensen	2017).	
3	The	court	exercised	its	discretion	pursuant	to	the	Jury	Act	1977	(NSW)	s	53C.	
4	Bourke	is	a	small	town	in	north‐western	New	South	Wales	of	under	3000	people.	Thirty	per	cent	of	its	population	are	
Indigenous.		
5	 Indigenous	 activists	 established	 the	 Tent	 Embassy	 outside	 Old	 Parliament	 House	 on	 26	 January	 1972	 –	 which	
Aboriginal	people	regard	as	‘Invasion	Day’	because	it	marks	the	beginning	of	British	colonisation	–	to	demonstrate	
against	government	policies	and	assert	Aboriginal	sovereignty.	See	Foley	et	al.	2013.	
6	Ultimately	the	all‐white	jury	rejected	Buzzacott’s	claim	of	right	submission	and	found	him	guilty	of	theft	(Anon.	2005b:	
11).	
7	The	Supreme	Court	in	Woods	&	Williams	v	The	Queen	(2010	NTSC	36:	[17])	declined	to	determine	the	jury	challenge	
and	 application	 for	 trial	 relocation	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 prejudicial	 publicity.	 This	 contrasts	 other	 decisions	 (for	
example,	Tuckiar	v	The	Queen	1934	52	CLR	335:	337,	347,	355;	Wotton	v	DPP	2006	QDC	202:	5‐6;	also	see	Burgess	
2009).	
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8	The	all‐white	jury	may	be	regarded	as	one	episode	of	a	series	of	racially‐charged	interactions	with	the	justice	system	
(Glowczewski	and	Wotton	2008:	4‐5).	
9	The	information	available	to	lawyers	is	usually	only	name	and	occupation	of	each	juror	(Hands	and	Williams	2009:	
26,	32,	Victorian	Law	Reform	Commission	2013:	32).	
10	Kang	et	al.	(2012:	1129)	note	that	implicit	biases	‘function	automatically’	including	‘in	ways	that	the	person	would	
not	endorse	as	appropriate	 if	he	or	she	did	have	conscious	awareness’.	They	are	not	 ‘consciously	accessible’	and	
therefore	difficult	to	remedy.	
11	Also	see	Cyr	v	Saskatchewan	(Attorney	General)	(2014	SJ	126)	in	which	the	Saskatchewan	Court	of	Queen’s	Bench	
held	that	efforts	to	include	First	Nations	people	on	the	jury	were	in	conformity	with	legislation	irrespective	of	the	
absence	of	First	Nations	jurors.	
12	Given	that	Officer	Wilson	was	not	indicted,	he	did	not	have	to	face	a	trial	where	this	could	have	been	an	issue	for	
jurors.	
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